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ABSTRACT This essay examines the nature of the left–right dimension in the Turkish context.
Using a nationwide representative survey conducted in 2006, the author estimates an ordered
logit model to analyze the determinants of self-placements on a conventional one-to-ten left–
right scale. The analysis reveals first that the scale does not reflect a fine-tuned grading along
the ten-point scale but rather creates ordered categories of “left,” “center,” and “right.”
Given this constraint, the issue content persistently reflects the expected impacts of issues and
demographic variables upon self-placements. Lastly, the author underlines the importance of
religiosity and qualifies its impact upon ideological self-placements.
Individuals possess a series of problems that define their linkage and involvement in
mass electoral politics. The most fundamental of these is one concerning the acqui-
sition, processing, and interpreting of information that is relevant to electoral poli-
tics and decisions to be made therein. The nature of this problem and the inherent
solution for its practical, if not theoretical, resolution is defined by two critical char-
acteristics. One is the fact that individuals have no rational incentives for involve-
ment in mass politics and therefore no incentives for bearing of the costs involved in
acquisition and processing of political information. This is the so-called “paradox of
voting.”1 Second is the presence of inherent and insolvable uncertainty in all aspects
of electoral behavior. Complex issues make individuals’ preferences very hard to
sensibly organize. By the same token, candidates or parties are at best ambiguously
positioned on this complex set of issues. Predicting the behavior of a massive
number of voters in the dynamic setting of a fast-changing political agenda is an
equally daunting task for an average citizen with modest education and intellectual
capacity. Given the problematic nature of information processing in uncertain mass
politics, how a mass democracy effectively functions becomes a critical question.
Theoretical Foundations
In his seminal book, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs
provides an insightful clue to this profound question and suggests that ideologies
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are simplifications of political complexities.2 Downs’s solution is an economic
answer to the costly problem of decisionmaking in the uncertain political world: 
[A] voter finds party ideologies useful because they remove the necessity of his
relating every issue to his own philosophy. Ideologies help him focus attention
on the differences between parties; therefore they can be used as examples of
all the differentiating stands. With this shortcut a voter can save himself the
cost of being informed upon a wider range of issues.3
Furthermore, Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger emphasize that “the
cleavages between parties separate along simpler, more predictable lines than an
n-dimensional policy space would imply, even if what voters care about is the n-
dimensional space.”4 A simplified low-dimensional space thus represents the
underlying conflicts not only more economically for the voters, but also accu-
rately, rendering them more predictable.
In an influential article, Philip Converse approached the issue from a different
methodological angle but reached similar conclusions.5 Based on extensive data that
showed a lack of intellectual consistency and information, he argued that “a few
crowning postures serve as a sort of glue to bind together many more specific atti-
tudes and beliefs and these postures are of prime centrality in the belief system as a
whole.”6 John Zaller followed similar lines and argued that “ideology … is a mech-
anism by which ordinary citizens make contact with specialists who are knowledge-
able on controversial issues and who share the citizens’ predispositions.”7 Earlier,
Zaller argued that values rooted in personality, philosophy, ideology, gender, expe-
rience, religion, occupation, ethnicity, or a simple interest in politics refer to stable
individual predispositions to accept or reject particular types of arguments.8 These
few core fundamental attitudes towards general moral and political principles shape
individuals’ attitudes and decisions concerning transient daily political issues.9 As
such, Downs’ earlier definition of ideology as “a verbal image of the good society
and the chief means of constructing such a society” is once again emphasized.10 In
short, either from the analytical approach of the spatial voting models or from a
more empirically based approach of the Michigan school, a similar functional
understanding of ideology is reached. As such, ideology does not refer to the legacy
of an intellectual school such as Marxism, conservatism, or liberalism but rather: 
[I]t is an agglomeration of views of different specialists sharing a common
predispositional bent … there is no particular need for members of the general
public to know technical details of the expert debate on these issues, or to know
why a given set of policies is conservative or liberal, in order to take positions
on them that are consistent with their ideological predispositions.11
From a Downsian perspective, Zaller offers a specific cost-saving function of the
specialist elites for the masses that help them make practical sense of the complexi-
ties of daily politics.
The left–right (L-R) ideological dimension is a widely used conceptual tool that
helps summarize ideological characteristics of individuals in mass politics. Dieter
Fuchs and Hans Dieter Klingeman argue that the L-R schema functions as a general
simplifying mechanism for the reduction of the complexities of the world of poli-
tics; it orients the masses to politics and acts as a tool of communication between
themselves as well as among the political elites who aim to mobilize them.12 Simon
Hix views the L-R schema as an invention enabling simplification into a simple
dichotomy or a single continuum.13 L-R helps summarize party programs and label
issues in an intelligible way for the masses.14
The L-R Schema in the Turkish Context
Although there is plenty of evidence that L-R fulfills the functions of ideology in
simplification and cost-saving for the masses in an uncertain and complex political
world, there is little study of its usefulness or cross-country traveling capacity into
the contexts of developing democracies. The use of L-R in Turkish electoral politics
as a campaign tool, in addition to serving as an explanatory framework in academic
studies, is relatively new. Although the intellectual roots of Turkish left and right
ideologies go further back, party politics witnessed L-R terminology primarily in the
aftermath of the 1960 coup. This event prepared a liberal constitutional framework
for the political involvement of the working classes, particularly in left-wing organi-
zations. The right-wing rhetoric of patriotic/nationalist orientations and of a reli-
gious conservative twist has had a longer and more prominent standing, dating back
to the pre-Republican era. However, rhetorical similarities, as well as similarities in
the nature and structure of the respective constituencies of both left and right in
Turkish politics as compared to other Western democracies, are at best ambiguous.
The conceptual framework that is most prominently used in analyzing Turkish
politics—that is, the center–periphery framework of [Scedil] erif Mardin—offers a conve-
nient, if not a well concerted, linkage to the L-R agenda. Mardin’s framework15 is an
interpretation of the socio-political history of Ottoman Turks as reflected on modern
Turkish politics. Mardin applies the Lipset and Rokkan methodology16 in a careful
and subtle way and presents an influential framework for the analysis of Turkish
electoral and party politics.17 According to this framework, Turkish politics is built
around a strong and coherent state apparatus run by a distinct group of elites domi-
nated by the military and bureaucracy. The “center” is confronted by a heteroge-
neous and often hostile “periphery,” composed mainly of peasantry, small farmers,
and artisans. The “center” is built around Kemalist secular principles. It represents a
state-run nationalist modernization program. The “periphery” reflects the salient
features of a subject and parochial orientation, to use Gabriel Almond and Sidney
Verba’s terminology.18 It is built around hostile sentiments towards the coercive
modernization projects of the center and includes regional, religious, and ethnic
groups with often-conflicting interests and political strategies.
Predominantly rural Turkey of the 1950s with its mostly isolated villages and
limited mass education, transportation, and communication facilities was perhaps a
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more fitting model for the center–periphery framework. Since then, significant
advances have been made on all dimensions of development, which may be taken as
a reflection of the integration of the periphery with the center. It has been observed
that: “Typical villagers of earlier decades, who lived in closed communities and had
little contact with outsiders, are fast disappearing. Rather the typical villager is more
likely to have relatives or former neighbours in the big cities of Turkey or
Europe.”19 Though Turkish society, which has largely been integrated through
widened access to communication and transportation, is more open than in the past,
the extent of its transformation into a modern social order is not so clear. Yılmaz
Esmer provides some clues as to the extent of differentiation between the value
systems of the center and the periphery.20 The level of trust in different institutions
is slightly lower for the more educated representatives of the center than for those
respondants in the periphery with relatively less education.21 More significant
differences are observed in respondents’ evaluations of the shortcomings of democ-
racy.22 In the rural areas, respondents seem to be much more supportive of a
“powerful” leader and military rule. Similarly, while the highly educated representa-
tives of the center seem to believe in the legitimacy of the democratic system in the
country, among the peripheral representatives the legitimacy of the democratic
system is considerably lower. More striking are the huge differences between the
center and the periphery representatives’ overall levels of tolerance in social rela-
tions. Esmer’s overall tolerance index shows that the less-educated representatives
of the periphery are significantly less tolerant than those in the center, who have a
greater degree of education.23
On the political front there is ample evidence of the continuity of center–periphery
cleavage. Ersin Kalaycıo[GBREV] lu’s analysis of the data gathered in the 1990 Turkish
Values Survey reveals “the continued importance of the conflict between the values
of the centre versus the values of the periphery,” which has come to be signified by
religiosity.24 In addition to religiosity, other typical variables reflecting peripheral
traits—such as ethnicity and place of residence—are also found to be significant in
the voting decisions of Turkish voters in determining party choice.25
Similar conclusions are obtained on the basis of a two-dimensional analysis of the
election manifesto data in the multiparty election period.26 However, the subtleties
of the rhetorical content of the manifestos are reflective of an emerging L-R expres-
sion. Continuing along a multidimensional explanatory framework, we argued that
Mardin’s center–periphery construct still maintains the overall salient characteris-
tics of Turkish politics that shape and reshape the modern-day party system’s
constellations of electoral preferences.27
Even a cursory evaluation of the Turkish party system in the multiparty era would
reveal a striking degree of congruity between center–periphery explanations and
broad historical patterns. The closing of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP)
and the execution of three from its top leadership by the military junta had a prime
implication for the organization’s electoral politics.28 The over-encompassing
peripheral umbrella of the DP with clear right-wing ideological tenets effectively
collapsed and gave way to increasingly potent ultra-nationalist and Islamist parties
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within the party system. The typical centrist elements of the party system in the
1950s and 1960s within the organizational umbrella of the Republican People’s
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) slowly transformed it into holding a left-wing
stand à la Turca. The relatively more marginal elements of the left also exploited the
electoral system of the early 1960s, which was congenial towards smaller parties, in
order to effectively earn seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye
Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM). More importantly, the CHP adopted a left-of-center
(ortanın solu) position that resembled the growing social democratic movement in
Europe at the time. Under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, the CHP increasingly
took on a sharp left stance, facing the equally polarized right-wing of the Nationalist
Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) and the pro-Islamist National
Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP). The more centrist Justice Party
(Adalet Partisi, AP) was the largest of the right-wing parties in the 1970s and was
forced to join two Nationalist Front (Milliyetçi Cephe) coalition governments,
which had disastrous consequences. The resulting uncontrollable political violence
in the country ultimately led to the third military takeover in 1980. Although the
reflections of a rural parochialism with strong ethnic and sectarian elements still
remained salient, the L-R expressions nevertheless rose to dominance in conceptual-
izations of the nature of Turkish politics in the late 1970s. This was not only an
academic undertaking but more strikingly a widespread popular understanding of
politics at large. Laymen on the Turkish streets increasingly used L-R terminology
to express opinions, to build broad categories of political positions, and quite
frequently to appeal for group solidarity in the mass political sphere.
The military regime of 1980 aimed at destroying ideological stances and dissolv-
ing the leadership cadres, who were to be replaced by colorless political machines
with wide-ranging nationalist developmental objectives. Not surprisingly, this naïve
project largely failed, but in the process it, to a large extent, made the masses apolit-
ical. Additionally, it effectively opened the ground for ideologically weakened
centrist-left and right-wing parties, which were transformed into purely patronage
distribution machines with overtly corrupt practices.29 As a result, the center of the
Turkish political space has miserably collapsed since the 1980s, giving way to a
resurgence of the once-marginal ultra-nationalist and pro-Islamist parties.
The pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) became the largest party in the
system in 1995, leading to a disastrous coalition that was strongly opposed by the
secularist establishment led by the massively popular military. The ultra-nationalist
MHP became the second largest party of the system in 1999. Following the closure
of the RP by the Constitutional Court, there was an eventual split in the rank and file
of the pro-Islamist leadership. This allowed former Istanbul mayor Tayyip Erdo[GBREV] an
to form the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) from
a younger generation of the Nationalist View (Milli Görü[SCEDIL] ) elite. The AKP toppled
the centrist establishment in the 2002 elections, obtaining about one-third of the
popular vote but capturing nearly two-thirds of the TBMM seats due to the peculiar
election system that requires nationwide electoral support of 10 percent of the
population for gaining access to TBMM seats.
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From the time when the pro-Islamists rose to prominence in mid-1990s, the new
meaning of center-right and its fit into the L-R framework has remained on the
agenda. Where do these newly formed parties stand on the L-R spectrum? Of what
kind of center and periphery could one talk in Turkish politics in the late 1990s,
approaching the new millennium?30
Despite widespread popular debate on these questions, as well as the existence of
a systematic data collection within the L-R framework, an empirical analysis of the
ideological orientations of Turkish voters has not been much studied.
Ever since Üstün Ergüder and Selçuk Özgediz’s first systematic study of Turkish
electoral behavior in the context of the 1977 general elections, L-R has been widely
used in academic studies.31 Nearly three decades of survey research provides
evidence that corroborates the historical depiction of developments on the electoral
scene described above.32 However, against the same historical background the rele-
vance of L-R becomes even more questionable than before. The essence of this
skepticism is both historical as well as conceptual and is based on very little empiri-
cal evidence. It has also been argued that although L-R remains by and large the
dominant dimension in the Turkish electoral space, its meaning may be undergoing
a rapid change, and a multidimensional framework offers a better explanation than a
single L-R depiction of the ideological space.33 Multidimensional analyses show
two dimensions that command the ideological competition in the Turkish party
system.34 The first and relatively more dominant dimension is the secularist versus
pro-Islamist cleavage. It is noteworthy that this cleavage largely overlaps with
center versus periphery formations in Turkish politics and also with left–right orien-
tations, thus being similar in many respects to Western European traditions. The
second dimension is ethnic cleavage, setting the Turkish and Kurdish identities in
opposition to one another and reflecting pieces of a larger reform debate in the
country around the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership.
One critical advantage of the L-R framework is long-term availability of data
that are collected in accordance with the international standards by adopting a
one-to-ten scale in nationwide representative surveys that allow for across-time
analyses of trends. However, despite this advantage, L-R in the Turkish context
has only been used either in a descriptive manner or as an independent variable in
explaining voting behavior and never—to the author’s knowledge—as a dependent
variable to be explained.35 This essay aims to fill this gap and to offer an empiri-
cal model that accounts for determinants of self-placement along the conventional
one-to-ten L-R scale. The essay also attempts to address two main questions. The
first concerns the content of L-R self-placements: what are the determinants of
individuals’ self-placements along the one-to-ten scale? What specific attitudinal,
issue preference, and demographic characteristics can be diagnosed among these
factors? The second concerns the quality of measurement by a one-to-ten scale:
what level of measurement does the scale offer? Is it inherently an interval, ordi-
nal, or categorical level of measurement? Are the categories of the one-to-ten
scale significantly different and equidistant from each other in the minds of the
respondents?
Data and Methods
Data for the ensuing analyses were collected as part of the New Faces of Turkish
Politics project carried out together with Ersin Kalaycıo[GBREV] lu.36 The field survey of
socio-political attitudes and political choices was conducted during late March,
April, and early May of 2006 in 23 of the 81 provinces of Turkey. Face-to-face
interviews were conducted with 1,846 respondents at the age of 18 and above. The
sample of respondents were determined through a multi-stage stratified cluster
sampling technique, which provided equal probability of selection per voting age
population (18 years and older) who were citizens of Turkey. The primary sampling
units were the provinces of Turkey, which were grouped according to the regions of
the Turkish Statistics Institute (Türkiye statistik Kurumu, TUIK). Accordingly,
Istanbul is a region of its own and all other provinces are grouped under 11 addi-
tional regions. Sample interviews were distributed to the regions according to the
urban–rural population shares for each region. Then two representative provinces
from each region were selected according to the Probability Proportionate to Size
(PPS) principle. Ten interviews were targeted from each village and urban block, so
a total of 200 villages and blocks were selected in the sample. In accordance with
the urban and rural population shares, 68 villages and 132 urban blocks were
randomly selected from the village and block lists obtained from TUIK. Then, ten
households were randomly randomly selected per census track or block. The inter-
viewers then randomly selected a respondent per household.
The L-R self-placement is obtained on a one-to-ten scale that posits the left-most
position as “one,” while the right-most position is “ten.” Respondents were asked to
pick an integer point between these two extremes that best reflects their personal
conviction. As such, the measurement of L-R positions of respondents via the scale
can best be thought of as an inherently rank-order measurement. Although a given
respondent scoring “one”—therefore placing him or herself at the left-most posi-
tion—shows fewer right-wing tendencies compared to someone picking “two” on
the same scale, it is simply not known how many fewer right-wing ideological
tendencies he or she has. Moreover, it is also not known whether the larger right-
wing tendencies of someone scoring “four” as opposed to “three” are of equal
magnitude compared to someone who chooses “two” as opposed to “one.” In other
words, equal differences in the scores do not necessarily correspond to equal differ-
ences in the underlying L-R tendencies of the respondents. Hence, they represent
categories of L-R that are simply ranked from the lowest to the highest. As such,
using ordinary least squares estimation methods is not justified. Instead, an ordered
logit model was used to estimate the determinants of informality for the four
samples.37
The ordered logit model is based on a measurement model in which a latent vari-
able y* is mapped onto an observed variable y. In this case, the observed variable is
the L-R index, representing the underlying unobserved L-R ideological tendency.
The observed L-R self-placement is thought of as providing incomplete information
about the underlying ideological stance y* according to a measurement equation: 
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Specified as such, the measurement problem takes the form of estimating the t’s—or
the thresholds or cut points—with the help of a structural model, using a set of inde-
pendent variables whose differential impacts on the likelihood of being placed into
one ranking as opposed to another can also be estimated.
In this case, the threshold parameters have significant substantive importance. If
it is assumed for a moment that the estimation revealed only two statistically signif-
icantly different threshold parameters, no matter which one of these one-to-ten
thresholds they may be, it would then be concluded that the underlying measure-
ment of the ideological positions is one that only nominally differentiates left from
right. On the other extreme, ten statistically significant thresholds could be obtained.
Then the concern would be whether or not the estimated distances between them are
equal and whether the estimated range of observations within a given rank overlaps
with preceding and following ranks. Assuming on the one hand that the threshold
separating “two” from “three” is twice the distance that separates “eight” and
“nine,” it will be inferred that a movement from “two” to “three” is reflective of a
more important right-wing ideological reorientation than a move from “eight” to
“nine.” If, on the other hand, the confidence intervals around the estimated thresh-
olds are overlapping across different rank-ordered categories, substantive distinction
between them would effectively disappear.
A significant advantage of using the ordinal logit model is due to the fact that
the effects of independent variables on the L-R dependent variable are allowed to
be non-linear. What this means is that when, for example, the respondent’s income
increases by a unit, its impact will not be identical at all points along the one-to-
ten scale. For example, a unit increase in income is expected to be largest around
the mid-range of the one-to-ten scale as compared to its left or right extreme
values. Since the respondents at the mid-range of the one-to-ten scale are of the
lowest ideological commitments, their likelihood of switching from one point on
the scale to another is greatest, while at the extreme ends the commitments are
much stricter and thus likelihood of switching from one point to another is
expected to be much lower.
Should the distances between thresholds be equidistant to one another? In one
cross-section of data at one point in time, the equidistance principle is not of much
practical significance. Respondents may have a much smaller underlying L-R ideo-
logical commitment that defines switching from one to another between “two” and
“three” compared to between “six” and “seven.” As long as these distances remain
more or less the same across different time periods or across different polities, they
simply reflect different cognitive processes at work along different points on the
scale. However, if these distances between the same two points on the scale change
over time or between different polities, they show that the cognitive processes at
work that evaluate the same two points on the scale do not remain constant over
time or over different polities. That is a serious problem that renders comparability
of the results across time and space very difficult.
y m t y t m Ji m i m= ≤ < =− if  for  to 1 1* .
It should also be noted that the significance of the threshold estimates also
depends on the number of observations at different points on the one-to-ten scale. In
Turkey there are many fewer people selecting the left-most points on the scale
compared to those who choose extreme right-wing positions. Accordingly, the
statistical significance of the extreme left thresholds is much less likely to be signif-
icantly different than the other points on the scale. That is a factor that simply
restricts the number of points on the scale.
A related issue concerns the discriminatory power of the estimated thresholds
across the ten-point scale. One could obtain significant threshold estimates that on
average are significantly different from one another. However, if the standard errors
of these estimates are too large, there would be categories that lie within the confi-
dence intervals of other threshold coefficients, thus making the substantive distinc-
tion between them problematic.
Results
Tables 1 and 2 below provide the estimates of the model for the self-positioned L-R
index values. First, an ordered logit model is estimated by using the conventional
one-to-ten L-R scale (Equation I). The overall fit of the model from Equation I is
quite satisfactory considering the pseudo-R2 values. With the exception of the first
threshold parameter, all thresholds are significant.
However, two problems still remain concerning the threshold estimates. First is
the fact that estimated stretch—that is, the difference between the left-most and
right-most estimated thresholds—is quite narrow. Not surprisingly, as the stretch
gets narrower, the standard errors of the estimated thresholds create overlapping
ranks. Figure 1 below provides a picture of the estimated threshold values and their
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Figure 1. Estimated confidence intervals around the threshold parameters.
associated 95 percent confidence intervals. What is striking in this picture is that
with the exception of the estimated jump in threshold value from rank “four” to
“five,” all consecutive confidence intervals do overlap. This suggests that individu-
als trying to make up their minds as to where to place themselves on the L-R scale
actually are faced with ambiguous unobserved thresholds.38 In other words, although
all thresholds except the first turn out to be statistically significant, since the esti-
mated stretch is too narrow, the confidence intervals of the estimated thresholds
overlap and effectively create just three rank-ordered categories along the L-R
dimension.
Figure 1. Estimated confidence intervals around the threshold parameters.Indeed, when the predicted categories—or for every individual, the response cate-
gory that has the maximum estimated probability for a factor/covariate pattern—are
obtained, it can be seen that only the left-most and right-most and category “five”
are predicted by the model. In other words, for no individual does the model predict
a higher probability for the first, fifth, and tenth categories. Figure 2 clearly shows
the reason why only rankings “one,” “five” and “ten” turn out to be the only
predicted ones. As indicated above by Figure 1, three ranges appear as effective
thresholds: clearly up to rank “five,” rank “one” has the highest average predicted
probability. Rank “five” dominates all others on average and within its threshold
range. Between ranks “six” and “ten,” once again, rank “ten” has the highest on
average predicted probability. As such, only three rankings are predicted. This obvi-
ously cannot be good news for L-R since it indicates that every category along the
one-to-ten L-R scale has no substantive meaning in the calculations of the individu-
als who seem to group themselves predominantly as left, center, or right-wing.
Figure 2. Mean estimated cell probabilities for response categories and their standard errors.Given the limited three-category ranking capability of the L-R dimension, the
determining factors that shape placements along these three rankings can still be seen.
Table 2 provides estimation results in detail by omitting the threshold parameters
Figure 2. Mean estimated cell probabilities for response categories and their standard errors.
estimates. Those coefficients with a positive estimated coefficient tend to push indi-
viduals towards the right end of the L-R spectrum, and those with a negative one tend
to go to the left end. It can be seen from these estimates that their impacts upon rank-
ordered self-placements are in accordance with the expectations. For example, minor-
ity rights rhetoric in evaluating factors that shape party choice has a left-leaning
impact. Similarly, democratic values and tolerance together with support for reform
are all associated with relatively more left-wing self-placements. It can also be seen
that the right-most impact of general evaluations of social change comes from the
position that supports returning back to past values and customs. Individuals support-
ing this category occupy the right-most position, and any other choice on that ques-
tion creates relatively more left-wing positions. Higher interpersonal trust, happiness,
and supportive evaluations of state authoritarianism raise the likelihood of right-wing
self-placement along the L-R spectrum. Strikingly, however, no measure of socioeco-
nomic status such as ownership of different goods or household income turns out to
be significant. In other words, L-R self-placements are shaped primarily by attitudinal
predispositions rather than clear-cut socioeconomic background variables. The criti-
cal impact of education here is also most likely to be significant, due to its influence
over the value systems of individuals. Those who are not primary school graduates
are relatively more left-wing compared to the rest of the sample.
It is also worthy to note that ethnic and sectarian backgrounds of individuals
consistently appear significant in differentiating people’s self-placements along the
L-R scale. Those individuals who are of Kurdish ethnic background or who show
signs of Alevism are relatively more left-wing. What then seems to occur is that
minority identity affiliations are associated more with left-wing orientations than
right-wing ones. The fact that increasing support for democratic values, reform, and
 Table 1. Estimated Threshold Parameters from the Ordered Logit Model
Threshold parameters
Equation I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Total 
stretch
Estimate 0.25 0.93 1.46 1.84 4.01 4.43 4.96 5.79 6.29 6.54
Level of significance 0.56 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Left Center
Equation II (1–4) (5)
Estimate 1.88 4.08
Level of significance 0.00 0.00
Equation I Equation II
Pseudo R2
Cox and Snell 0.37 0.34
Nagelkerke 0.37 0.39
McFadden 0.11 0.20
change also exerts leftward tendencies in self-placements is indicative of the
progressive nature of the left-wing orientations, as they are reflected in individual
self-placements. In other words, Sunni Turks with less education who are more
trusting but less supportive of reform and democratic values are associated with
right-wing self-positioning, while those of Alevi or Kurdish background with rela-
tively higher levels of education and tolerance, and who have supportive predisposi-
tions towards reform and democratic values, are more prone to self-position
themselves on the left-wing end of the L-R spectrum.
Critical retrospective evaluations of the government’s performance concerning
the economy also increase the likelihood of left-wing self-placement. As far as the
individuals and their L-R self-placements and attitudinal characters are concerned,
some sort of progressive twist in individuals of left-wing orientation is obtained,
whereas those individuals who lean towards the right appear more religious, more
state-centered and authoritarian, and less tolerant. One peculiar aspect of the Turkish
right-wing that is related to social change concerns institutional change that would
base the legal system on the rules of Shari’a. Individuals who are supportive of this
change in the Turkish legal framework are more likely to self-place themselves
towards the right end of the L-R scale.
Given the above-underlined problems of the overlapping structure of the thresh-
old estimates, the same model was also run with a truncated L-R scale. That is, the
L-R self-placements were recorded as “left” if an individual self-placed between
“one” and “four” on the conventional one-to-ten scale, as “center” if the individual
was at “five,” and “right” if he or she was between “six” and “ten,” as suggested by
the above analysis of the thresholds. Table 2 shows that although the coefficient
estimates vary from Equation I to Equation II, the qualitative implications of these
changes do not alter any of the substantive conclusions. However, one additional
advantage of using this three-category rank-order scale of left–center–right is that
the estimated thresholds no longer overlap. The number of observations within
every rank is large enough to allow for precise enough estimates that unambigu-
ously separate one rank from another.
One last issue that should be addressed using the framework offered by the
ordered logit model is the relative significance of different variables upon individual
self-placements. What is the substantive impact of, for example, religiosity in shap-
ing the self-placement decisions of individuals? Could an individual of right-wing
predispositions switch from right to left if hypothetically speaking his or her level of
religiosity is manipulated? For example, two different scenarios were run, and self-
placement predictions for every rank-ordered category were estimated on the L-R
scale in accordance with two scenarios. According to scenario 1, minimum right-
wing and maximum minority rhetoric in party vote, lowest level of happiness, and
very bad retrospective evaluation of economic conditions were used. It is also
assumed that the individual is neither Kurdish nor has an Alevi background and is
not a primary school graduate. As to his or her predispositions towards social
change, it is assumed that he or she advocates a return to old traditions and customs.
Lastly, it is assumed that this individual did not have a politically active family in
 Table 2. Ordered Logit Model: Threshold Parameters Omitted
Equation I Equation II
Estimate
Level of 
significance Estimate
Level of 
significance
Party choice criteria 1: rightist rhetoric 0.17 0.00 0.10 0.08
Party choice criteria 3: minority rights 
rhetoric
−0.15 0.00 −0.22 0.00
Party choice criteria 5: leadership charisma 0.18 0.00 0.17 0.00
Democratic values (additive) −0.01 0.03 −0.01 0.01
Interpersonal trust (additive) 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02
Happiness (additive) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
State authoritarianism (additive) 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
Tolerance (whom would one want as a 
neighbor)
−0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.00
Support for reform (additive) −0.01 0.03 −0.01 0.01
Self-evaluated religiosity (from 1 = not at all 
religious to 10 = very religious)
0.15 0.00 0.11 0.00
Self-evaluated conservatism (from 1 = not at 
all conservative to 10 = very conservative)
0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00
Would want a legal system that 1 = would 
give no place to Shari’a to 10 = strict Shari’a
0.08 0.00 0.05 0.03
Prefers society should radically change −0.34 0.02 −0.33 0.04
Prefers society should gradually and slowly 
change
−0.14 0.25 −0.20 0.15
Prefers protecting society from any change −0.32 0.02 −0.28 0.08
Family identified with a party −0.18 0.07 −0.28 0.01
Retrospective sociotropic economic 
evaluations (from 1 = worst to 10 = very 
good)
0.11 0.00 0.13 0.00
Did not speak Kurdish with their family in 
their childhood
0.75 0.00 0.72 0.00
Does not show any signs of Alevism 0.36 0.01 0.45 0.00
Is not a primary school graduate −0.22 0.02 −0.29 0.01
Ownership status 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.23
Excluded variables: age, sex, urban–rural location, dummy variable for those who partici-
pated in different protests, dummy variable for those who support EU membership, dummy
variable for those who support lifting the turban ban, policy preferences (1 = all economic
activity should be carried out by state to 10 = state should have no role in the economy),
policy preferences (1 = all political decisions should be made by the central state to 10 = all
political decisions should be made by local governments), attitudes towards uncertainty,
employment status, dogmatism, anomic attitudes, political efficacy, attitudes towards change,
religious liberalism, religious conservatism, self-esteem, attitudes towards customs and tradi-
tions, monthly average household income.
childhood and thus has a non-partisan past in the family. These are obviously
assumptions that would create a left-leaning individual, and Figure 3 shows that
combined with the lowest level of self-evaluated religiosity, the highest likelihood
that this individual would pick a point on the L-R scale appears to be the left-most
position, “one.” Then this individual’s level of self-evaluated religiosity is increased
from “zero” to “ten” and all other variable values are kept constant at the scenario
levels. What is observed is that this hypothetical individual’s predicted probability
of self-placement at the left-most position of “one” declines and becomes dominated
by a steadily increasing centrist (“five” on the one-to-ten L-R scale) position only at
about a religiosity score of “eight” on a zero-to-ten scale of self-evaluated religios-
ity. From that point on, centrist probability is higher than all other rank-ordered
categories.
Figure 3. Impact of religiosity on predicted probabilities of L-R self-placement scenario 1.After reaching the highest level of religiosity in this scenario, new elements are
then added into the scenario, keeping the religiosity level at its maximum. When,
for example, the hypothetical individual becomes more trusting, centrist tendencies
continue to rise in his or her self-placement probabilities. Additionally, the condi-
tion of being at maximum level of state authoritarianism pushes the centrist tenden-
cies a little higher. The last increase in a centrist probability of self-placement
comes with the assumption of zero tolerance for the hypothetical individual. From
then on, adding the assumption of maximum conservatism or approval of Shari’a
just reduces the predicted probability of a centrist self-placement and increased
probability associated with right-most self-placement. However, what is striking is
that once the individual is assumed to be predisposed to all the left-wing character-
istics, just one additional assumption of right-wing preferences or attitudes cannot
tilt the balance and render the predicted probability of right-wing self-placement
Figure 3. Impact of religiosity on predicted probabilities of L-R self-placement scenario 1.
dominant over the others. Increasing doses of religiosity combined with additional
doses of right-wing preferences or attitudes leaves the centrist self-placement still
dominant.
A similar scenario that creates a clear right-wing predisposition at the start was
also run. What this scenario suggests is that starting with a dominant centrist posi-
tion and increasing the level of self-evaluated religiosity slowly pushes the individ-
ual towards the right-most position. However, besides the right-most position,
which tends to rise in probability with the centrist position’s probability on decline,
other predicted probabilities do not radically change (see Figure 4). When the hypo-
thetical individual finally becomes “very religious,” then the predicted probability
for the right-most position becomes dominant over the rest of the scale options.
Then, additional assumptions about increased trust, conservatism, and approval of
Shari’a simply raise the predicted probability of the right-most position. Adding
Kurdish and Alevi background decreases it but never makes it dominated by other
self-placement options, which remain within the same range of predicted probabili-
ties. Only the predicted probability of the centrist position seems to be sensitive to
changes in the scenario, and all other ranks remain almost unaffected.
Figure 4. Impact of religiosity on predicted probabilities of L-R self-placement scenario 2.
Conclusions
The analysis above provides new evidence about the nature of L-R ideology for
the case of Turkey. The left and the right as reflected in the determinants of self-
placements along the L-R scale have no tangible socioeconomic basis such as
economic deprivation but have instead bases in ethnic and sectarian differences.
Only simple educational differences among the socioeconomic background
Figure 4. Impact of religiosity on predicted probabilities of L-R self-placement scenario 2.
variables seem to matter in shifting individuals along the L-R scale. More striking
is the prevalence of attitudinal and policy preference differences. “Left” is charac-
terized by progressive, tolerant, democratic attitudes with low levels of religiosity
and critical evaluations of the economic policy performance of the government.
“Right,” on the other hand, is characterized by more trusting and happy individuals
who are of low tolerance levels. Right-wing is also more prone to maintenance of
the status quo, more state authoritarianism, and less democracy in its value predis-
positions. Individuals who approve of Shari’a rule in the legal system of the coun-
try also tend to group themselves in the right-wing.
The analyses also suggest that there are primarily three groups of ideological self-
placements instead of a one-to-ten scale. In the minds of the people, degradations of
ideological orientations between left-most “one” and right-most “ten” is too ambig-
uous. Instead, they seem to use three categories: the left, the center, and the right.
The magnitudes of influence exerted by the explanatory variables upon individual
self-placements are such that switching from left to right is very unlikely. Instead,
increasing, for example, the levels of religiosity can only make an already left-wing
individual somewhat centrist but not rightist. A centrist individual who experiences
increasing religiosity could eventually self-place him or herself on the right-wing. In
other words, once a left, center, or right-wing predisposition is settled in an individ-
ual, change in that dominant predisposition seems quite difficult to achieve.
The above-presented estimation of a rank-ordered logit model also suggests that
the conventional L-R scale might just be too complicated for the Turkish layman.
The fact that only three rank-ordered categories are suggested by the estimated
model instead of the presently used ten-point ranking can be taken as a sign of
unease on the part of the respondents who were given this scale for evaluation.
These respondents seemed to suggest that they simplified the ten-point scale into
three ranks of left, center, and right. However, no matter whether a ten- or three-
point classification along the L-R dimension is used, the mental or intellectual
nature of these self-placements suggests a significant degree of congruence with the
expectations concerning the nature of the L-R dimension. The left attracts tolerant,
democratically oriented, progressive change-seekers with low religiosity, some
degree of economic complaints, and a low level of interpersonal trust, while the
right is more trusting, happy but conservative, religious, and seeks maintenance of
the status quo with some degree of authoritarianism and lack of tolerance.
At least two further questions concerning the implications of these findings
require further research. One concerns the apparent nature of shifting preferences of
self-placements along the L-R scale since the 1980s. The diagnosis commonly
agreed upon is a continual shift towards the right end of the spectrum in Turkey,
and that the “meaning” of L-R has changed. It is impossible to disagree with the
latter and difficult to agree with the former. It is difficult to agree that people are
shifting from left to right since there is no panel data evidence of that phenomenon.
Turkish society is aging, and with age a move towards the right could be observed.
Individuals looking into the political world of Turkey throughout their lifespan
see and interpret what they see differently. Therefore, as long as panel data remain
unavailable, what is necessary is perhaps to see the world through the eyes of simi-
lar individuals at two points in time and consider how these hypothetical individuals
would behave. Such a hypothetical judgment might reveal the convincing power of
the shifting ideological positions hypothesis keeping the changing meaning of the
ideological debate constant.
The second and more profound question concerns the multidimensionality of the
ideological discourse in the country. The above analysis reveals that a rich array of
determinants shape the likelihood of self-placements of individuals along the L-R
dimension. Many of these determinants lend themselves to a further in-depth analy-
sis that is likely to reveal relatively independent evaluations of individual positions
in a higher dimensional space and the locations of the parties therein. The agglomer-
ating nature of the L-R spectrum might just be forcing individuals to lump fine
degradations of different positions into the fewer but more inclusive and over-
encompassing ranks that were suggested by the above analysis. If the issue space
can be better grasped through more sensitive and accurate measurement frame-
works, then its multidimensional character might be better achieved.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank to Alpay Filiztekin and Sabri Sayarı for their helpful
comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
Notes
1. Andre Blais, To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), pp.2–10.
2. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
3. Ibid., p.98.
4. Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger, Ideology and the Theory of Public Choice (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1994), p.3.
5. Philip Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in David Apter (ed.), Ideology
and Discontents (New York: Free Press, 1964).
6. Ibid., p.211.
7. John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992), p.327.
8. John Zaller, “Information, Values and Opinion,” American Political Science Review, Vol.85, No.4
(1991), p.1216.
9. Anthony Heath, Geoffrey Evans and Jean Martin, “The Measurement of Core Beliefs and Values:
The Development of Balanced Socialist/Laissez Faire and Libertarian/Authoritarian Scales,” British
Journal of Political Science, Vol.24, No.1 (1993) pp.115–32.
10. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p.96.
11. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, p.328.
12. Dieter Fuchs and Hans Dieter Klingeman, “The Left–Right Schema,” in M. Kent Jennings and Jan
W. van Deth (eds.), Continuities in Political Action (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1990), p.205.
13. Simon Hix, “Dimensions and Alignments in European Politics: Cognitive Constraints and Partisan
Responses,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol.35 (1999) pp.69–106.
14. Ronald Inglehart and Hans Dieter Klingemann, “Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the
Left–Right Dimensions among Western Publics,” in Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe and Dennis Farlie (eds.),
Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition (London: John
Wiley and Sons, 1976).
15. [Scedil] erif Mardin, “Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?,” Deadalus, Vol.2, No.1
(1973), pp.169–90.
16. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter
Alignments: An Introduction,” in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems
and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp.1–64.
17. Mardin’s work (1973) carries a number of similarities with Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) discussion of
historical cleavages in Western polities.
18. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
19. Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and the Secular State in Turkey,” in Çigdem Balım (ed.), Turkey: Political,
Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), p.94.
20. Yılmaz Esmer, Revolution, Evolution, Status-Quo; Social Political and Economic Values in Turkey
(Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Publications, 1999).
21. Ibid., p.49.
22. For example, while 37 percent of the rural respondents agree with the statement that in democracies
maintenance of public order will be difficult, among urban settlers only 26 percent agree. See ibid., p.80.
23. Ibid., pp.88–90.
24. Ersin Kalaycıo[GBREV] lu, “Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey, Changes and Continuities in the
1990s,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.27, No.4 (1994), pp.402–25, at p.422.
25. Ersin Kalaycıo[GBREV] lu, “The Shaping of Political Preferences in Turkey: Coping with the Post-Cold War
Era,” New Perspectives on Turkey, Vol.20, No.1 (1999), pp.47–76, at pp.64–66; Ali Çarko[GBREV] lu and
Binnaz Toprak, Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset [Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey] (Istanbul:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Publications, 2000), pp.117–18.
26. Ali Çarko[GBREV] lu “Turkish Party System in Transition: The Connection Between Macro-Level Party
Competition and Agenda Change in Election Manifestoes,” Political Studies, Vol.49 (1998),
pp.544–71.
27. Ali Çarko[GBREV] lu and Melvin J. Hinich, “A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences,” Electoral
Studies, Vol.25, No.2 (June 2006), pp.369–92. See also Ali Çarko[GBREV] lu, “Turkish Party System in
Transition” and William M. Hale, “Democracy and the Party System in Turkey,” in Brian W. Beeley
(ed.), Turkish Transformation, New Century, New Challenges (Walkington, England: The Eothen
Press, 2002).
28. For a comprehensive overview of the historical development of political participation and electoral
politics in Turkey, see Ali Çarko[gbrev] lu and Ersin Kalaycıo[gbrev] lu, Turkish Democracy Today: Elections,
Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006).
29. Clientelistic elements in Turkish politics have long been noted. See Sabri Sayarı, “Some Notes on
the Beginnings of Mass Political Participation,” in Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.),
Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems (Istanbul: Bo[gbrev] aziçi
University Press, 1975); and A. Kutad, “Patron–Client Relations: The State of the Art and Research
in Eastern Turkey,” in Engin D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.), Political Participation
in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems (Istanbul: Bo[gbrev] aziçi University Press, 1975),
pp.61–87 for pioneering accounts. The author’s argument here is not that patronage politics were an
invention or novelty of the 1980s, but rather that these politics remained as the single most prominent
factor stripped of its ideological commitments that were effective during the late 1960s and 1970s.
30. Çarko[GBREV] lu, “Turkish Party System in Transition,” pp.554.
31. Üstün Ergüder, “Changing Patterns of Electoral Behaviour in Turkey,” Bo[GBREV] aziçi Universitesi Dergisi
[Bogazici University Journal], Vols.8–9 (1980–81), pp.45–81.
32. See the detailed discussion of the L-R research in Çarko[GBREV] lu and Kalaycıo[GBREV] lu, Turkish Democracy
Today, pp.113–60.
33. See Çarko[GBREV] lu and Hinich, “A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences” and Çarko[GBREV] lu and
Kalaycıo[GBREV] lu, Turkish Democracy Today, pp.113–20.
¸
g˘
g˘
g˘
g˘
g˘
g˘
˘ ˘
˘
˘
g˘
g˘
g˘ g˘
g˘ g˘
g˘
34. See Ersin Kalaycıo[GBREV] lu, “Türkiye’de Siyaset” [Politics in Turkey], in Sivil Toplum için Kent,
Yerel Siyaset ve Demokrasi Seminerleri [Seminars in City, Local Politics and Democracy for Civil
Society] (Istanbul: World Academy for Local Government and Democracy Publications (WALD),
1998); Hale, “Democracy and the Party System in Turkey” and Çarko[GBREV] lu and Hinich, “A Spatial
Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences.”
35. One notable exception is Emre Yüce’s working paper: “Testing the Robustness of the Ten-Point
Left–Right Self-Placement Scale across Advanced and Developing Countries,” MA essay, May
2004, Penn State University, Department of Political Science, wherein the Turkish case is also used
within a comparative context.
36. The project was generously funded by the Open Society Institute–Turkey.
37. For an accessible treatment of the analysis of ordered outcomes, see Scott J. Long, Regression
Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables (London: Sage, 1997).
38. For example, a threshold value of 1.5 corresponds to either rank “three” or “four.” Looking at these
overlapping thresholds then, one sees that there is an unambiguous left threshold at about 2.7, below
which one could pick values from “two” to “four,” and beyond which one is likely to be in the realm
of center-right self-placement. The right-most threshold is significantly different only from the
threshold of “five,” beyond which one self-places him/herself as “six,” all the way to “ten.” Between
2.7 and 4.9 one is at “five,” the center. Above 4.9, self-placement effectively indicates right-of-center,
while below 2.7 is left-of-center.
g˘
g˘
